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The present paper presents an overview of contemporary reasoning research to examine the 
evidence for and implications of the Dual Strategy Model of Reasoning. The Dual Strategy Model 
of Reasoning proposes that there are two types of reasoning strategy applied in deductive reasoning 
- counterexample and statistical. The paper considers Mental Models Theory and The Probability 
Heuristics Model as candidate specifications for these respective strategies and hypotheses are 
proposed on this basis. The Dual Strategy Model is further considered in the context of Dual Process 
theory, the Dual Source Model and Meta-reasoning and implications of the synergy between these 
proposals are considered. We finally consider the Dual Strategy Model in the context of individual 
differences, and normative considerations before proposing novel hypotheses and further avenues 
of research which we argue require exploration in this context. 
 







Deductive reasoning - the capacity to evaluate the logical validity of a 
conclusion based upon its premises - is a fundamental aspect of human cognition 
(e.g., Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991), and understanding its variability remains an 
essential problem for cognitive science to address. Historically there was a debate 
over the fundamental deductive mechanism employed when reasoning (Johnson-
Laird & Byrne, 1991; Rips, 1994), but this has been superseded by the view that an 
array of strategies can be employed (Ford, 1995; Roberts, 1993, 2000; Verschueren, 
Schaeken, & d'Ydewalle, 2005a, 2005b). There has also been a switch to viewing 
reasoning processes through the lens of dual process theory whereby process are fast, 
effortless and heuristic (Type 1) or slow, effortful and analytic (Type 2). Over the 
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last decade the 'new paradigm' in reasoning research has moved the emphasis away 
from normatively sanctioned logical benchmarks as a gold standard, and towards 
understanding and describing individual differences in interpretation, processing, 
metacognition and strategy (e.g., Elqayam & Evans, 2011; Roberts, Newstead, & 
Griggs, 2001; Stupple & Ball, 2014). 
One innovative response to this development is the dual-strategy model of 
reasoning which proposes that individuals have access to both statistical and 
counterexample strategies (Markovits, Brisson, & de Chantal, 2015b; Verschueren 
et al., 2005a, 2005b). Thus individuals differ in their strategy preference and these 
strategies have differing processing demands and response outcomes. 
Counterexample strategies are typically slow and effortful and place higher demands 
on working memory, this contrasts with statistical strategies which are faster and 
entail a lower working memory demand (e.g. Markovits et. al., 2015b). The model 
is broadly consistent with a dual-process framework, with each of the strategies 
featuring similar characteristics to Type 1 and Type 2 reasoning processes, however 
there are important contrasts between these theoretical proposals (Markovits et al., 
2015b), as both statistical and counterexample strategies include Type 1 and Type 2 
processes.  
In the following literature review we present a brief overview of classic 
theoretical proposals that are candidates to underpin the different strategies (Mental 
Models Theory and the Probability Heuristic Model), before moving on to consider 
the evidence base for the theory. We further consider the Dual Strategy Model in the 
context of meta-reasoning, soft normativism and individual differences, and propose 




Johnson-Laird (1983) proposed the Mental Models Theory (MMT) by adapting 
the proposal that 'small-scale models' of reality are constructed through perception 
(Craik, 1943), to the reasoning domain. This view was developed and refined into 
the MMT we know today. The contemporary MMT makes three main assumptions 
about model construction (Johnson-Laird, 2001, 2006): 1. Each model is 
representative of a possibility; 2. Models are iconic: the components and structure of 
the model correspond to the components and structure of the possibility; 3. Models 
represent what is true, but not what is false (Johnson-Laird & Savary, 1999). This 
process occurs in three stages. In the comprehension stage, reasoners use pragmatic 
understanding of language, and general knowledge, to interpret the premises and 
construct a model of them. During the description stage, a parsimonious model is 
formulated that integrates the premises and contains information not explicitly stated 
in them and is a putative conclusion to them. Finally, the validation phase is a search 
for counterexamples to falsify the putative conclusion. If no counterexamples are 
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found the conclusion can be accepted. However, not all participants engage in the 
search for counterexamples. 
MMT predicts that as the number of models required increases so does the 
difficulty in making an inference; and that multiple model problems take longer and 
exhibit more errors (Johnson-Laird, 2001). Errors and processing time predictions 
are related to the limitations of working memory, as the consideration of multiple 
models can overload its capacity (e.g., Halford, Wilson, & Phillips, 1998). Syllogistic 
Figure further influences the working memory demand whereby figures without 
contiguous middle terms require the reordering of premises or switching the order of 
terms within premise(s) through a conversion process (Johnson-Laird & Bara, 1984; 
Stupple & Ball, 2007). MMT further predicts that individuals spontaneously develop 
a variety of model building strategies for deductive inferences with increased 
experience, for example, considering the most informative premise first (Bucciarelli 
& Johnson-Laird, 1999).  
If MMT is an accurate description of the counterexample strategy in dual-
strategy theory, these predictions should hold for reasoners who prefer a 
counterexample-based approach. Indeed, it includes possibility of meta-strategies 
within this group whereby variations in counterexample search and model building 
strategies should vary based on reasoning experience and/or aptitude. There is also 
evidence that many reasoners do not move beyond their initial model to search for 
counterexamples when generating conclusions from premises rather than evaluating 
presented conclusions. These individuals may be better characterized as having a 
dichotomous interpretation of the truth value of the conclusion rather than employing 
a counterexample strategy, they could still show less influence from the statistical 
information than those who prefer a statistical strategy, but not go beyond their first 
mental model. 
 
Probability Heuristic Model 
 
Classic paradigms in the psychology of deduction were based on binary logic 
whereby all assertions can be allocated one of two values: true or false. However, a 
Bayesian view of cognition challenged this approach (e.g., Oaksford & Chater, 2007; 
Tenenbaum, Kemp, Griffiths, & Goodman, 2011), with probability theory or Bayes 
theorem considered as the normative standard against which reasoning should be 
judged (e.g., Chater & Oaksford, 1999; Elqayam & Over, 2013), and the view that 
deductive reasoning was probabilistic rather than logical. When initiating the dual 
strategy perspective Verschueren et al. (2005a, 2005b) proposed a minimalist view 
of the probabilistic/statistical strategy. However, in the present paper we explore the 
more highly specified Probability Heuristics Model (PHM), proposed by Chater and 
Oaksford (1999) as a putative account of the statistical strategy - particularly in the 
context of syllogistic reasoning.  
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PHM proposes that individuals employ heuristics to yield a probabilistically 
valid (p - valid) conclusion. The application of probabilistic heuristics has a number 
of assumptions. First, that different quantifiers vary in their informativeness such that 
some quantifiers are more informative than others. Second, some quantified 
assertions entail others (p - entailment). For example, the use of a 'particular', Some 
or Some are not, rather than a 'universal', All or No, implies that the universal 
statement is incorrect. In conjunction with these principles, reasoners apply 
probabilistic generation and testing heuristics to produce conclusions (see Chater & 
Oaksford, 1999, p. 196-202). One example is the min-heuristic which prevents the 
generation of conclusions that are more informative than the least informative 
premise. 
PHM proposes that these assumptions and heuristics combine to provide a 
complete description of the processes that underlie reasoning. Indeed, the model has 
been successfully applied to a variety of reasoning problems, previously explained 
by models subscribing to logic as the norm against which reasoning is measured, 
including conditional inference (e.g. Oaksford, Chater, & Larkin, 2000), the Wason 
Selection task (e.g. Oaksford, Chater, & Grainger, 1999) and syllogistic reasoning 
problems (e.g. Chater & Oaksford, 1999). Similarly, work on syllogistic reasoning 
has also offered empirical support for the PHM demonstrating that the PHM can be 
extended to syllogisms featuring quantifiers such as 'Most' and 'Few' which have no 
logical conclusion (Chater & Oaksford, 1999). From the perspective of a Dual 
Strategy Model the PHM allows a detailed specification of likelihood assessments 
derived from the properties of the quantifiers, which would occur in conjunction with 
any contextual or belief driven influences on conclusion plausibility.  
The PHM is not without criticism: 'No valid conclusion' responses are not well 
explained by the model (Hattori, 2016); and there is some debate over the 
conclusions that should be produced (e.g., Elflein & Ragni, 2018; Hattori, 2016). 
Such issues could be avoided if the Probability Heuristic Model described a possible 
strategy rather than a fundamental reasoning mechanism. For example, no valid 
conclusion responses can be predicted by counterexample strategies, particularly if 
participants have interpreted the task as requiring a judgment of logical necessity (or 
if we allow the possibility of mid-task strategy switching among some reasoners). 
Finally, some authors suggest PHM as a dual process account with Type 1 heuristics 
to generate conclusions and test procedures to determine p-validity (e.g., Schroyens, 
Schaeken, & Handley, 2003), as we will see later, this view aligns well with statistical 
strategies as outlined by Markovits and colleagues. 
 
The Dual-Strategy Model 
 
The dual-strategy model originated from work by Verschueren, Schaeken, and 
d'Ydawelle (2005a, 2005b) and proposed that reasoners employ two qualitatively 
different strategies for deductive reasoning: statistical and counterexample. This 
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model combines the explanations of counterexample models, derived from MMT 
(e.g., Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991) and probabilistic theories (e.g. Oaksford & 
Chater, 2007) and presents them as strategies rather than unitary frameworks. 
Counterexample strategies are associated with dichotomous assessments of validity 
and involve higher cognitive demand and increased working memory load - 
particularly where participants move beyond basic model description. In comparison, 
statistical strategies are faster, intuitive and require fewer cognitive resources -
aligning with aspects of dual process theory but with notable caveats.  
For instance, according to Markovits, Brisson, and de Chantal (2016) the dual-
strategy model does not, however, describe a pure heuristic process, rather, the model 
focuses on the way in which logical inferences are made. The essential distinction of 
the model is that underlying statistical information from knowledge about the 
premises can influence the way the information is processed. Statistical strategies are 
essentially Bayesian and generate estimates of presented/generated conclusions 
being true (Oaksford & Chater, 2007; Oaksford et al., 2000). This contrasts with 
counterexample strategies whereby the ease with which a counterexample can be 
generated is dependent on both the logical structure of the problem and the likelihood 
of the conclusion given our knowledge of reality - as the number of plausible 
counterexamples increases so does the likelihood of a rejection. (e.g., Johnson-Laird, 
2001).  
Support for the dual-strategy model of reasoning derives from a series of studies 
conducted by Markovits and colleagues (e.g. Markovits, Brisson, & de Chantal, 
2015a, 2015b, 2016; Markovits, Brisson, de Chantal, & Singmann, 2018; Markovits, 
Brisson, de Chantal, & Thompson, 2017; Markovits, Brunet, Thompson, & Brisson, 
2013; Markovits, Lortie Forgues, & Brunet, 2012) which provide strong evidence 
for the distinction between counterexample and statistical strategies. Markovits et al. 
(2012) developed a method to distinguish between these reasoning strategies, by 
presenting problems accompanied by statistical information that described the 
likelihood of the putative conclusion. Individuals who rejected low probability 
conclusions more frequently were identified as adopting a statistical strategy. In 
contrast, individuals who were not influenced by the presence of statistical 
information were considered to adopt a counterexample strategy. There does 
however, remain the question as to whether these strategic preferences exist on a 
continuum or as a dichotomy. 
Under time constraints, individuals preferentially adopt a statistical reasoning 
strategy (Markovits et al., 2013), but when reasoning without time constraints, 
reasoners preferred a counterexample strategy. This supports the argument that 
statistical strategies are less cognitively demanding than counterexample strategies, 
consistent with the prediction of the dual-strategy model, and indeed dual-process 
frameworks more generally. However, the task characteristics that encourage this 
preference warrant further consideration and replication with alternative paradigms 
and instruction sets. Response-time effects have shown that deductive inferences are 
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typically faster when reasoners adopt a statistical strategy (Markovits et al., 2016). 
These experiments demonstrate some clear commonalities with standard dual 
process theories and it was a logical step for Markovits and colleagues to apply this 
approach to belief bias. 
The dual-strategy model predicts a greater tendency to base responses on 
conclusion believability when a statistical strategy is used, because beliefs can drive 
likelihood assessments of conclusion. Across three different forms of reasoning, 
effects of conclusion belief were observed to be stronger for statistical strategies, 
compared to counterexample strategies (Markovits et al., 2017). Belief bias was 
stronger with probabilistic strategies, but was not eliminated among those using 
counterexample strategies. Ball and Stupple (2016) described three categories of 
dual process theory of belief bias: Default Interventionist, Parallel and Hybrid 
accounts - it is also not clear-cut which category of belief bias theory best explains 
the data. Within the Default-Interventionist account a dominant, default intuition is 
initially generated by Type 1 processing, which may be overridden by Type 2 
processing. This intervention can occur when there is a lack of confidence in the 
default conclusion and cognitive resources are sufficient. Default responses 
generated by Type 1 processes are often convincing, and initiating Type 2 processing 
requires significant cognitive effort (Stanovich, 2009; Thompson, 2009) so Type 1 
can win-out. Default interventionist explanations typically assume a mental models 
as representations (e.g., Evans, 2000; Stupple, Ball, Evans, & Kamal-Smith, 2011), 
but it would be possible to develop a probabilistic default interventionist account 
where defaults were derived from intuitive belief, but could be overridden by test 
procedures determining p - validity.  
In contrast, parallel-processing models propose that both Type 1 and Type 2 
occur simultaneously (e.g. Sloman, 1996; Stupple & Ball, 2008) with Type 1 
outcomes being suppressed when conflict generates meta-cognitive uncertainty. 
These models could also have more probabilistic specifications. Finally, hybrid dual-
process theories offer a further alternative (Bago & De Neys, 2017; Handley & 
Trippas, 2015), whereby serial and parallel mechanisms that include intuitive 
heuristics and logical or probabilistic intuitions deliver Type 1 outputs that can 
coincide or conflict. When these processes deliver conflicting outcomes analytic 
processing is triggered to reduce metacognitive uncertainty by resolving the conflict. 
Hybrid accounts require little modification to include Type 1 processes based on 
beliefs/context and probabilistic heuristics applied to quantifier combinations. 
Evidence for multiple sources of intuition feeding into the reasoning process is now 
well established (e.g., De Neys, 2012; Handley & Trippas, 2015; Trippas, Handley, 
Verde, & Morsanyi, 2016) and these factors would be expected with either strategy, 
that belief based intuition has more impact in probabilistic strategies.  
Hybrid models of belief bias are consistent with the proposals from Trippas, 
Thompson, and Handley (2017) who show evidence of slow belief responses and 
fast logic responses. They also concur with the dual-source model which proposes 
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that, individuals must combine prior knowledge of information surrounding the 
subject matter and information concerning logical form (Singman, Klauer, & Beller, 
2016; Singmann, Klauer, & Over, 2014). Hybrid and dual-source models are in broad 
agreement that there are intuitions based on knowledge/belief /context and upon the 
logical form/probabilistic heuristics/pragmatics that influence reasoning processes 
and outcomes - the precise specifications, such as the extent to which these processes 
conform to the characteristics of Type 1, how conflict is resolved and how they 
generalise across different tasks with differing complexities remains an open 
question for the field. 
Markovits et al. (2018) combined the dual-source model, with the dual-strategy 
model, and demonstrated that logical form influenced deductive inference equally 
for both counterexample and statistical reasoners. Logical form was also observed to 
influence probabilistic inferences that used explicit statistical information although 
these findings were less clear-cut. This nuanced finding requires further unpacking 
in future studies to explore whether intuitive influences derived from logic or belief 
have the same underlying mechanism irrespective of the strategy adopted, or whether 
task interpretation and intuitions differ between strategy groups. We concur with 
Markovits et al. that understanding the effects of logical form, reasoning strategy and 
the form of inference is a minimum requirement for a complete theoretical account 
of deductive inference. However, we would go further and suggest that a 
comprehensive deductive reasoning theory should also predict individual differences 
based on working memory capacity, cognitive disposition, perceived normative 
standards that the participants work towards, and the interpretation of the quantifiers 
and connectives. These individual differences impact upon the metacognitive 
processes and meta-reasoning that are central to strategy selection (and perseverance 
with or abandonment of that strategy), as well as the degree of confidence required 
to endorse a solution (and the calibration between this and response accuracy).  
A metacognitive account of reasoning process is a vital component in any 
reasoning theory, as the act of monitoring and controlling reasoning processes, and 
allocating cognitive resources are central to the completion or otherwise of the task 
(Ackerman & Thompson, 2017a). Ackerman and Thompson (2017a) presented a 
framework for meta-reasoning research inspired by metacognitive approaches in 
learning and memory research (Bjork, Dunlosky, & Kornell, 2013; Nelson & Narens, 
1990). Much metacognition research focused on learning and memory and their 
associated monitoring and control processes, but the metacognitive processes that 
underlie reasoning (or meta-reasoning) and problem solving (Ackerman & 
Thompson, 2017a, 2017b; Bjork et al., 2013), are an increasing priority.  
One fruitful approach to examining meta-reasoning processes is that applied by 
Thompson and colleagues (e.g., Thompson, Prowse-Turner, & Pennycook, 2011) 
which has focused on feeling of rightness (FOR) using a two-response methodology. 
The two-response methodology requires participants to quickly provide a first 
response, then rate the FOR about this response before being offered the opportunity 
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to revise it. This methodology was applied to the min-heuristic demonstrating that 
min-conclusions resulted in stronger FOR and were also processed more quickly, 
than non-min-conclusions. Additionally, min-conclusions were less frequently 
reassessed and fewer changes in responses were given to these conclusions. These 
data support at least this component of PHM as a candidate for Type 1 elements of 
statistical reasoning strategies. 
However, as FOR are the result of heuristic cues, the amount of time allocated 
to reanalysing the initial response may not be indicative of problem difficulty or 
cognitive load (Ackerman & Thompson, 2017b). Indeed, as answer fluency is related 
to heuristic cues, incorrect answers can be given with high levels of confidence 
(Thompson et al., 2011; Thompson & Johnson, 2014). Familiarity with problem 
content also has a similar effect of producing high levels of confidence in incorrect 
answers (Markovits, Thompson, & Brisson, 2015; Shynkaruk & Thompson, 2006). 
However, it is also possible in some cases that FOR can indeed reflect problem 
difficulty, such as in the presence of conflicting answers (De Neys, Cromheeke, & 
Osman, 2011; Thompson et al., 2011). 
Despite the developing evidence for the metacognitive processes involved in 
the initiation and termination of analytic thinking, more work is required to explore 
the metacognitive processes that underlie strategy selection. Beilock and deCaro 
(2007) investigated the costs of selecting strategies, and found that the least 
demanding strategy is the most likely to be selected. Further research on the 
monitoring and control processes that influence strategy selection is also needed. 
Reder and Ritter (1992) demonstrated that strategy selection may be impaired by 
monitoring processes that are based on misleading information. The processes 
associated with strategy selection may be based on heuristic cues and thus the 
reliability of such cues should influence the quality of strategy selection (Ackerman 
& Thompson, 2017b). Determining the extent to which strategy selection is 
volitional or implicit is a further consideration - particularly as Roberts (2000) has 
argued that participants are capable of switching strategy between tasks or even 
across trials using the same tasks. Some participants in the Dual strategy paradigm 
demonstrated strong preferences for statistical or counterexample approaches, but 
others were less clear cut - these individuals may indeed be strategy switchers. 
In a novel study Bajšanski, Žauhar, and Valerjev (2018) applied metacognitive 
methods to syllogistic reasoning tasks and examined the extent to which 
consensuality effects generalise from general knowledge tasks to reasoning. They 
demonstrated that while confidence and accuracy were not strongly correlated, 
participants were more confident when generating the most common answers to the 
reasoning problems. This methodology is an excellent approach to identifying 
commonalities between reasoners and can help to identify the cues that influence 
reasoning processes and outcomes. This approach may be particularly valuable in the 
context of the Dual Strategy theory as the different outcomes for statistical and 
counterexample reasoners would suggest a lack of commonality between these 
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groups. Applying this method to the different groups may identify different patterns 
of consensuality and help to triangulate the different properties of the strategies. 
Metacognitive processes have been shown to play a vital role in initiating (e.g. 
Markovits et al., 2015; Shynkaruk & Thompson, 2006; Thompson et al., 2011; 
Thompson, Evans, & Campbell, 2018) and terminating (e.g. Ackerman, 2014) 
analytic thinking, as well as strategy selection (e.g. Bröder & Newell, 2008; 
Markovits et al., 2013; Reder & Ritter, 1992; Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 2008). As such, 
developing understanding of these processes is essential to expanding our 
understanding of reasoning, and potentially, improving performance (Ackerman & 
Thompson, 2017b). 
 
Future Directions and Conclusions 
 
It is our view that the Dual Strategy model has immense promise in explaining 
the extreme variability in reasoning performance. Perhaps the great strength of the 
approach is its compatibility with other perspectives, with success and potential to 
draw upon classic theories proposed as fundamental deductive mechanisms, dual 
process theory and dual source models, as well as the important development in 
meta-reasoning. We would contend however, that while the integration of such a 
range of paradigms makes for an exciting prospect we would caution that this will 
generate as many new questions as it does answers. In this final section we outline a 
modest range of proposals to further extend the approach. 
The Dual Strategy Model has a good evidence base thus far, but the detailed 
specification of the mechanisms in the two strategies involved requires further 
empirical demonstration to determine where the limits of the generalisability lie. We 
argue that there is much potential in the use of MMT and PHM as candidate 
specifications for the two strategies. The fact that these accounts are so highly 
specified, with a substantial range of well-established effects is double-edged as it 
allows for strong predictions but also reduces the parsimony of the account.  
One empirically testable contrast between statistical and counterexample 
strategies based upon the contrast between MMT and PHM is the role of syllogistic 
figure. A counter example strategy based on MMT principles would entail a 
cognitive load associated with integrating the premises to form a mode in the 
description stage when the middle terms of the problem are not contiguous (e.g., 
figure BACB should be more demanding than ABBC, cf. Stupple & Ball, 2007). In 
contrast to MMT the PHM makes no strong predictions about syllogistic figure and 
a more general statistical strategy would not necessarily require a premise integration 
process and as such would not show this differential cognitive load. 
At the core of the Dual Strategy Model is the assumption of individual 
differences and that these differences can be fundamental to the way that individuals 
approach their reasoning. However, there is an extensive literature on individual 
differences in reasoning that has not yet been applied to the model (e.g., Stanovich 
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& West, 2000). An examination of the individual differences in cognitive ability, 
disposition, interpretation, response time and motivation of reasoners who apply 
different strategies is likely to be prudent. It would be predicted - in line with dual 
process predictions (e.g., Stupple et al., 2011; Stupple & Ball, 2014; Stupple, 
Pitchford, Ball, Hunt, & Steel, 2017) that participants who respond faster (using a 
statistical strategy) may be more likely to be cognitive misers with lower working 
memory spans (Stupple, Gale, & Richmond, 2013). It is a further possibility that 
statistical strategies represent a failure or absence of 'decoupling' the problem from 
the mental simulation of its solution (Toplak & Stanovich, 2012). In the present 
context this would entail suspending pragmatic, contextual and belief-driven 
elements of a problem to enable hypothetical thinking about its abstract properties - 
in line with view of Type 2 thinking at its purest. 
We would argue that adopting a 'soft normativist' approach (e.g., Stupple & 
Ball, 2014) would facilitate this - soft normativism allows for normative evaluations 
of reasoning performance alongside the pursuit of descriptive research goals. Thus, 
the unnecessary constraints of rigid normativism and the slippery slope of strong 
relativism in judging the outcomes of our reasoning processes are avoided. For 
example, the use of Bayesian and Logic based normative benchmarks may be 
instructive as to the strategies being employed because different participants may 
view these different standards as appropriate to the task at hand. Indeed, the 
recruitment of participants untrained in logic raises the possibility that task 
interpretation involves an informal or naïve reflective equilibrium whereby 
participants attempt to give the most rational response available in line with 
normative standards they are aware of or reasoning strategies they deem appropriate 
to reach their goal (see Stupple & Ball, 2014 for further description of this view). 
Where a participant judges the reasoning task as one of determining the plausibility 
of the conclusion rather than its logical necessity (a judgement for which they may 
lack the requisite mindware) a probabilistic strategy could be considered a 
reasonable, rational approach.  
In conclusion, the recent developments in the reasoning literature: the Dual 
Strategy Model, dual-source (e.g., Singmann et al., 2014) and Hybrid models (Bago 
& De Neys, 2017) and the increasing focus on Meta-reasoning (Thompson & 
Ackerman, 2017a) offer considerable optimism for the reasoning domain. Dual-
process theories require more nuanced specification to address the critics of the 
approach (e.g., Keren & Schul, 2009; Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011) and these new 
approaches - dual strategy, dual-source and meta-reasoning provide the means to 
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